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Abstract  
 
This paper empirically investigates the effects of a particular type of illiquidity on 
asset finding the average illiquidity discount is around 77%, and the transaction of 
restricted shares slightly decreases the price of otherwise identical freely-traded shares, 
by 0.61%. We build an empirical model to study how the discounts vary with firm-
specific and transaction-specific variables finding that illiquidity discounts are 
positively related to the length of trading constraints, and volatility. In the end, we 
make a comparison of discounts from empirical and theoretical models (Longstaff 
1995 and 2001) and propose some explanations for the difference between them.  
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1. Illiquidity and Trading Constraints 
 
The concepts liquidity and illiquidity refer to the degree of ease and certainty with 
which assets can be converted into cash. There are extensive bodies of literature 
studying the illiquidity issue. Early studies studies defined illiquidity in terms of bid-
ask spread and transaction costs. Examples include Glosten and Milgrom (1985), 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) Constantinides (1986), Easley and O' Hara (1987), 
Glosten (1987), Glosten and Harris (1998), Stoll (1989), Davis and Norman (1990), 
Grossman and Laroque (1990), Dumas and Luciano (1991), Jouini and Kallal (1998), 
etc. Under this definition of illiquidity, an investor can still trade unlimited amounts 
whenever desired, albeit at some cost. 
 
There is a more extreme case of illiquidity which we focus on in this paper. Due to 
some imposed contractual or legal constraints, certain shares are forbidden from 
trading for an extended period which may last for years, and may be of indefinite 
duration. The period of constraint duration is known as the constraint horizon. There 
are many important classes of assets restricted by such trading constraints. For 
example, in an IPO (Initial Public Offering), the purchaser gets the shares at a 
discount, but is not allowed to resell them immediately. Initial dominant shareholder 
sometime also promises not selling any shares in a certain period right after IPO.A 
CEO often receives stock as part of a compensation package, but he/she is usually not 
allowed to trade it very soon. In America, traded shares that are not registered in SEC 
(Securities and Exchange Commission) are not allowed to be resold within a two-year 
constraint horizon. “Letter stock” is a typical example used in past study of illiquid 
assets. The biggest scale of restricted shares in the world may be the restricted shares 
in China Stock Market, where more than two thirds of all shares are restricted from 
free trading.  
 
Empirical evidence suggests that restricted assets, or assets showing illiquidity 
characteristics, are often valued at a large discount to comparable freely-traded assets. 
Discounts discussed in those studies are defined on the price differences between the 
price of freely-traded shares and price of restricted shares, expressed as percentages of 
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the former. By summarising the evidence from eight different studies of restricted 
stock, spanning the 1966 to 1984 period, Pratt (1989) found the mean and median 
percentage discount range from 25.8% to 45.0%. This is consistent with a later study 
by Silber (1991), whose empirical results show that restricted stocks are sold at an 
average price discount of 33.75 percent, in a range from 12.7 percent to 84 percent 
and the amount of the discount varies with the firm and the issue characteristics.  
 
Brenner, Eldor and Hauser (2001) are the first group of researchers to focus on the 
restricted options. They empirically examined the effect of trading constraints on 
option values rather than on its bid-ask spread by comparing the prices of restricted 
bank-issued option and freely-traded exchange-traded option in Israeli currency 
market. They document a 21% gap between the price of freely-traded options and 
restricted options on the exchange rate, and find that the difference cannot be 
arbitraged away, due to transactions costs and the risk that the exchange rate will 
change during the bidding process. 
 
The results from theoretical studies are consistent with those findings. In early 
theoretical research, Mayers (1972,1973) and Brito (1977) shows that illiquidity 
discounts can occur in equilibrium models, and the size of the discount depends 
(inversely) on how closely the optimal portfolio strategy for an investor approximates 
the buy-and-hold. Longstaff (1995) derived analytical expressions for the upper bound 
of by using option-pricing theory. Longstaff (2001) investigated the influence of 
trading constraints on optimal portfolio choice and illiquidity discount of a portfolio 
with restricted shares and riskless asset relative to freely-traded shares with riskless 
asset.  
 
Most recently Longstaff (2006) found in one equilibrium model that the existence of 
trading constraints affects not only the price of restricted assets, but also the price of 
freely-trade assets. Under liquidity constraints, the freely-traded share is priced at a 
premium, and restricted share is priced at a discount, relative to the intrinsic value 
which is identical to both of them. The approach of the end of the constraint horizon 
causes these two prices to converge. In empirical work, intrinsic value is not discussed 
in this way because it is not directly observable. In the present study we do not 
directly consider theoretical models of the liquidity discount relative to intrinsic value, 
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but we borrow from these models the concept that price differentials may fall as a 
known or unknown constraint horizon emerges. We also borrow the convention of 
expressing discount as a percentage of the (observable) freely traded price, rather than 
of the unobservable intrinsic value, which is actually fundamental to the theory. 
 
The objective of our study is to investigate empirically the effects of trading 
constraints along with other empirical correlates on the relative prices of fully traded 
and restricted shares in the China Stock Market. This market has the largest pool of 
restricted assets in the world, and it offers the special feature that the restricted shares 
and fully traded shares in the same company always have identical dividend and 
voting rights, and differ only in liquidity.  
 
This paper is organised as following: data and methodology are introduced in the next 
section. We also introduce some background and features about the trading 
constraints in China Stock Market. Section three presents the statistical summary 
empirical investigation and analysis. Afterwards, we use a new benchmark NAVPS 
(Net Asset Value per Share) to study the price of restricted shares. In Section five, 
existing theoretical models are extended and applied to compare with empirical 
findings. Section six offers main finding and conclusion.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 
2.1 Background and Data 
 
The China Stock Market provides a unique (and perhaps historically brief) 
opportunity for empirically investigating the effects of trading constraints on share 
prices. There are three categories of shares for every listed company in China: 1) State 
Shares, which are directly owned by Chinese government and effectively not freely 
traded; 2) Legal Person Shares, which are shares owned by corporations, including 
other shareholding companies, non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) and State-
owned-enterprises (SOEs) and are very infrequently bought and sold between these, 
by special permission; 3) Ordinary Shares, which can legally be held by private 
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individuals, and are effectively continuously traded in the Shenzhen and Shanghai 
Exchanges.  
 
The three categories of shares in each company enjoy identical voting rights and 
dividends per share, and the only difference is that the trading constraints are imposed 
on first two categories of shares in order to prevent losing state direct and indirect 
control of those companies. Although the trading constraints affect a majority of all 
shares, they are not expected to remain permanently in place. The trading constraint 
has uncertainty in the proportion of restricted shares that can be transferred or 
auctioned occasionally, and in the length of the constraint horizon, in the end of which 
all shares becomes freely-traded. The trading constraint has been progressively 
abolished by the process of so-called Division Reform started in August 2005 and 
expected to mainly finish in 2010. Trading constraints are not imposed on companies 
newly listed after the launch of Division Reform. The effects of releasing existing 
trading constraints will be discussed in our future paper in detail.  
 
As figure 1 shows, restricted shares account for around two third of total number 
shares in the markets. Though the restricted shares are forbidden from free trading, 
they can change hands (only between SOEs and agencies of government), after 
approval from administrative commissions. A transaction in State Shares has normally 
taken the form of a private placement, whereas a transaction in Legal Person Shares is 
normally in the form of auction. Those occasional transactions provide us a chance to 
observe the price of restricted shares. In this paper, we focus only on restricted shares 
traded in auction, since these transactions are more numerous, more transparent, and 
hypothetically more free of unobservable private intra- and inter-corporate agendas.  
 
The data covering 4084 valid auctions have been collected from three sources: the 
Centre of China Economic Research Services (CCER), Chinese Security Regulation 
Committee (CSRC) and DataStream. They coverall auctions of restricted shares in 
China Stock Market history (with varying accuracy and completeness) and the 
potential sample is finite, because auction, as a way of transferring restricted shares, 
was forbidden as soon as Division Reform was launched in 2005.  
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In the earliest version of this paper, we used DataStream as the source of the prices of 
freely-traded shares, for comparison with the auction process of restricted shares. 
However the resulting estimates of price discounts had very erratic distributions. On 
checking carefully, we found many errors in the price of freely-traded shares given by 
DataStream; hence we decided to use the prices of freely-traded shares from CCER, 
although the CCER sample has 1000 missed values compared with DataStream. 
 
2.2. Methodology  
 
The main hypothesis of our study is that restricted shares are priced at a discount 
relative to their freely-traded counterparty, but the goal was to establish the size of the 
discount and to look for correlates with the size of the discount, using candidate 
variables drawn from theoretical or previous empirical work.  
 
In order to be consistent with the theoretical model by Longstaff (1995, 2001, 2006), 
and us, we use the discount tD , rather than relative price as the dependent variable.  
t
tt
t FP
RPFPD )( −=     (1) 
where tFP the price of is freely-traded shares and tRP  is their restricted counterparty.  
 
In selecting the potential empirical descriptive variables, we incorporate those in the 
empirical model by Silber (1991).  There are two categories of variables; firm specific 
and transaction specific variables. 
 
Firm-specific Variables 
P/B (Price of freely-traded share to Book Value) gives idea about whether investors 
pay too much for what would be left if the company went bankrupt immediately. A 
lower P/B ratio could mean that the stock is undervalued or is fundamentally wrong. 
P/E (Price of freely-traded share to Earning) is popular measure of share’s valuation. 
The higher the ratio, the more favourable the share is. A high P/E Ratio reflects 
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investors' expectation of a higher earning growth in the future compared to companies 
with a lower P/E. 
FR: The number of freely-traded shares divided by the total number of shares of the 
listed firm. It is a proxy of the marketability of firm’s shares.  
lnMC: The natural logarithm of the market capitalisation of the freely-traded shares 
listed in exchange. It measures a company's total value of all A-shares2. 
Volatility: It refers to the amount of risk about the change of a share's value. 
NAVPS: Net Asset Value per Shares is an indicator giving an estimate of the value of 
a share after all assets are sold and all liabilities are paid off. It is usually below the 
market price in that the current market value of the shares is higher than the value 
appearing on the historical financial statements used in calculation of NAVPS. 
Dividend (Dividend Yield): Dividend yield shows how much a company pays out in 
dividends each year relative to its share price. It is a way to measure how much cash 
flow investors get from dividends. 
Age: The number of years since the company gets listed.  
Exchange (Dummy Variable): 1 if the firm listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange; 0 if 
the firm listed in Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  
SEO (Dummy Variable): 1 if the firm is a state-owned enterprise; 0 otherwise 
Profit-Status (Dummy Variable):  1 if the firm have normal profit status; 0 is the firm 
bear loss in past 3 years and has been put ST (special treated) in front of the firm by 
Exchange.  
 
Transaction-specific Variables 
RTT: the ratio of the number of restricted shares in the transaction relative to the total 
number of shares of the listed company.  
SqRTT: the square of ARRT.  
RTR: the ratio of the number of restricted shares in the transaction relative to the total 
number of restricted shares of the listed company. 
T: The number of years till trading constraints in China Stock Market is released. T is 
an ex post value in that it was unknown to all investors even to the government when 
                                                 
2 Freely-traded shares priced in Renminbi (Yuan) are A-shares; Freely-traded shares priced in Dollars 
(in Shanghai Exchange) and Hong Kong Dollars (in Shenzhen Exchange) are B-shares. B-shares used 
to be only open for foreigner  before Sep. 2001.  
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those transactions occurred (because those transactions only happened before Division 
Reform, until which the T was specified by government). We assume investor has a 
more or less accurate expectation of it i.e. it equals the length (in years) between the 
transaction day and 2010 when Division Reform finishes.  
 
3. Empirical Findings 
 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 shows the mean transaction size of restricted shares in auction is 1,165,013 
shares per transaction. RTT, the number of restricted shares auctioned relative to the 
total number of shares in the listed firm is 0.61% indicating that only a small 
proportion of shares involved and auctions are unlikely to lead to changes in the 
control of a listed firm. RTR, the number of restricted shares auctioned, relative to the 
number of restricted shares in the listed firm is also a small fraction, 1.00% only 
showing the permission of occasional auction is only for a small proportion of 
restricted shares. The medians of AT and AR are even smaller - both below 0.05%. 
The trading constraint is not absolute but still very strict.  
 
Table 2 displays the overall descriptive statistics of the illiquidity discount observed 
in the auction. The DA ′ column is the illiquidity discount in auction is calculated 
based on the price of freely-traded shares the day before the auction.  
1
1
−
− −=′
t
tt
FP
RPFPDA      (2) 
 
The AD  column is calculated based on the closing price on the announcement day.  
t
tt
FP
RPFPAD −=           (3) 
 
The Difference column shows the difference between those two discounts and 
calculated by: 
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t
t
t
t
FP
RP
FP
RPDAAD −=′−
−1
       (4) 
 
If 0>′− DAAD , then tt FPFP <−1  implying the price of the freely-traded share 
increases on the auction of its restricted counterpart.  
If 0<′− DAAD , then tt FPFP >−1  implying the price of the freely-traded share 
decrease on the auction of its restricted counterpart.  
 
The average discounts one day before and after auction are 78.13% and 77.18%. 
Those three medians are all greater than corresponding means. The Difference is 
0.62% indicating an auction of restricted shares slightly decreases the price of their 
freely-traded counterparts. Although after one occasional transaction, trading 
constraints still exist, investor may regard those transactions as an implicit signal of 
releasing trading constraint. Such decrease reflects their fear of releasing trading 
constraint dilutes the share price of freely-traded share.  
 
3.2 Regression Model 
 
Table 3 shows that the percentage discounts from one day before the auction are 
strongly correlated with all chosen variables; expect the volatility which is a proxy of 
risk. Discounts from the auction day are strongly correlated with all variables and 
have exactly the same signs with figures on their left column.  
 
Negative correlations are found between discounts and Exchange identity of Shanghai, 
SOE, Profit, Ln-MC, NAVPS, Dividend, and Age showing that SOEs, large firms, 
firms listed in Shanghai, firms with normal profit status are associated with lower 
discount. Companies with higher NAVPS and dividend yield offer smaller discount. 
On the contrary, the discounts vary positively with FR, RTT, RTR, P/B, P/E and T 
showing restricted shares from companies with bigger proportion of freely-traded 
shares is associated with bigger discount. Growth companies offer smaller discount. 
In addition, with the approach to the Division Reform, the illiquidity discounts 
become small.  
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The third column shows the difference between discounts from one day before the 
auction and from the auction day. This negatively varies with Exchange, Profit, lnMC, 
NAVPS, Age and T indicating that transaction of restricted shares from companies 
listed in Shanghai, with normal profit, with bigger market capitalisation, with higher 
net asset value per share, or with bigger age tend to decrease the price of their liquid 
counterparts.  
 
The table 4 shows for both discounts from the day before announcement and those 
from the auction day, nine explanatory variables left after the filtering steps of 
stepwise method used to build our regression model. The intercepts and all significant 
variables from 1st and 2nd column are with same signs. This fact is not surprising in 
that those two discounts are close.  
 
Discounts from company listed in Shanghai Exchange are 3% smaller than discounts 
from those listed in Shenzhen Exchange. The reason might be caused by the 
characteristics of those two exchanges: Companies listed in Shanghai normally with 
greater market capitalisation. Natural logarithm of market capitalisation is an 
explanatory variable in our model. The sign of its coefficient is consistent with the 
sign of Exchange. It is possible that both variable measures same characteristics of 
companies. Moreover, transactions volume in Shanghai Exchange is greater. Volume 
is a proxy of liquidity although different from the type of illiquidity we address in this 
paper. High trading volume is associated with price premium and consequently larger 
discount. If this is the case, the result contradicts to the finding. A possible 
explanation could be investors believe those two types of illiquidity are linked in a 
positive way, so they offer a higher price on those restricted shares whose liquid 
counterparts enjoy higher degree of liquidity in terms of high trading volume.  
 
The sign of FR is not as we expect: If the company has a higher proportion of freely-
traded shares, when its restricted shares become freely-traded, the freely counterparts 
are under less pressure of dilution. A possible explanation is that, normally companies 
with high FR are small in market capitalisation. FR and RTR does not significant 
showing that the proportion of shares involved in the transaction does not matter. Sq-
RTT is an explanatory variable to capture the effects that the transaction price 
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positively varies with the proportion until when the proportion reach a level that 
makes the purchaser obtain the control of this company.  The effect does not appear 
significantly in the sample. The possible reason is that as showed in Table 1 
proportion involved in auction is generally too small to lead change in control.  
 
B/P has a small negative influence on the discount showing that discounts from 
growth companies are smaller. NAVPS and Dividend both have negative coefficients 
indicating that company with one more unit of NAVPS lead 1.66% smaller discount 
and company with one unit increase of dividend yield lead 1.58% decrease in discount. 
With every one year aged, the discount decreased by 1.80%.  
 
Volatility is an important variable in theoretical model.  For a single asset, the level of 
volatility determines the opportunity cost for being restricted; for portfolio, the level 
of volatility determines the optimal portfolio strategy and consequently the discount. 
As we expected, higher volatility lead to larger discount. T is another variable in all 
theoretical models to capture the main characteristics of the trading constraints. 
Consistent with theoretical model, it has a positive influence on the discount. With a 
bigger T, the investors lose more in that they cannot rebalance the portfolio to take 
advantage of the price increase and prevent deep loss in decrease. 
 
The third column shows that auctions of restricted shares from older companies and 
those with bigger proportion of freely-traded shares raise the price of freely-traded 
shares, whereas auction of restricted shares from companies with high NAVPS 
decrease the price. Moreover, with approach of Division Reform, the influence of 
auction on freely-traded shares decreases. In general however, beyond these small 
effects, the market reacted little to the announcements of auctions. This may reflect 
the small fraction of shares sold in the auctions, which might have had little economic 
effect at all, but it may also reflect efficient pricing of the shares.  
 
4. An Alternative Measurement 
 
In the China Stock Market, a benchmark often used to estimate the lower bound on 
the value of restricted shares is Net Asset Value per Share.  This measure (although 
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lacking any obvious economic foundation) is frequently discussed in the press and by 
regulatory commission who approve occasional transaction of restricted shares. We 
therefore tested NAVPS as a possible metric for comparing the relative prices of 
restricted shares and freely-traded shares. Table 5 shows that freely-traded shares are 
priced at a premium of 1000.39% relative to NAVPS. The premiums from restricted 
shares are much smaller: only 126.73% indicating that restricted shares are priced one 
fourth greater than their NAVPS. The difference between them is huge, namely 
877.46% showing that due to imposed trading constraints, the premium from 
restricted shares is around one ninth of that from freely-traded shares. This in effect 
confirms the finding from other sources that the discount (unweighted by size of 
transaction) is a large fraction of the price of the fully traded shares.  
 
Table 6 shows the regression model. Difference from the model based on discount, all 
dummy variables here are significant, two key variables (T and volatility) in 
theoretical models are not significant, and RTT becomes significant. 2R , smaller than 
2R  from the model from the previous measurement 0.359, is only 0.225. We may 
conclude that, although NAVPS is often referred as the benchmark to evaluate 
restricted shares, it is unlikely investors and regulatory use discount as a more directly 
benchmark as a way of measurement.   
 
5. Comparison with Theoretical Results.  
 
5.1 Upper Bound of Illiquidity Discount 
Longstaff (1995ab) presents a simple analytical upper bound for the illiquidity 
discount. Consider there is only one risky asset with price of tS  traded in the 
economy with dynamics: 
dZSdtDS σµ +=  (5) 
where µ  and σ are constants and Z is a standard Brownian motion.  
 
Assume an investor endowed with one unit of asset who is planning to maximise 
wealth at some time horizon T. A hypothetical investor with perfect market timing 
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ability can sell the asset and reinvest in the riskless asset so as to maximise the wealth 
at time T, calling this UT where    
)(max )(0 t
tTr
TtT SeU
−
≤≤=  (6) 
where t could be any time between 0 and T, r is the interest rate. As showed in the 
function (6), the investor is only allowed to change his position once.  
 
However, if during the period from time 0 to T, a trading constraint is imposed on this 
investor, he cannot change his position at all and must receive cash flow worth TS at 
the end of constraint horizon T. The difference between TU  and TS  is the incremental 
cash flow the investor would receive if trading constraint is released i.e. the upper 
bound on the value of being unrestricted. Its present value at time 0 is  
 
][][),( T
rT
T
rT SEeUEeTSF −− −=        (7) 
where S is the value of the asset at 0t  and r  is interest rate.  
 
By using the density function for the maximum of a Brownian motion over an interval 
of length T (Harrision 1985), the close-form solution for the upper bound is obtained: 
S
T
TsTsSTNTsSTSF −


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

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2
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22
)(2),( σ
π
σσσ     (8) 
where ( )⋅N  is the cumulative normal distribution function. )(sσ  is the volatility of 
share price.  
 
Table (7) and figure (2) show the above upper bound F(S,T) of the illiquidity discount 
for different values of volatility and T They show that the illiquidity discount is 
positively related to the length of the trading constraint and the volatility of S. The 
directions of these relationships as agree with our empirical models of illiquidity 
discounts. 
 
The size of discounts from empirical and theoretical results could not be directly 
compared directly in that the input parameter T was not explicit for the restricted 
shares in China until Oct 2005 when the government announces the Division Reform 
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a process to release all trading constraints3, a process lasts around 5 years to 2010. We 
did not conduct comprehensive survey about investors’ expected T in China Stock 
Markets before 2005. However, if we assume that investors did correctly forecast T 
where T=2010-t i.e. TTE ≈][ , what we can conclude is that illiquidity discount 
observed from the data of restricted shares in China stock market is within the range 
of upper bound suggested by the above theoretical model (Longstaff 1995). 
 
The gap between empirical discount and upper bound is still greater than the gap 
between US empirical discount for letter stocks and the Longstaff (1995) upper bound. 
The US gap is so small that Longstaff (1995) argues that his upper bound is tight, and 
actually provides useful an approximation to the empirical value of marketability for 
US letter stocks. It is not surprising because the hypothetical investor in the model 
does not have such perfect timing ability which can make him sell the share at the 
highest price over T, but rationality to trade. Moreover, the investor is only allow to 
trade freely-traded shares once, particularly from the position of risky asset to riskless 
asset making the investor cannot make as much money as he could make if he can 
change position freely between those two types of assets and can borrow money. 
Those two assumptions limited the potential of wealth growth during from 0 to T and 
make the obtained upper bound close to the empirical discount.  
 
For our sample, however, the T for restricted shares in China is much longer than T 
for letter stocks. With a 10-year constraint horizon T, shares with volatility greater 
than 0.3 have a Longstaff (1995) upper bound on their illiquidity discount close to 
100% i.e. the price of a restricted share is close to 0. The empirical discount is far 
smaller. For a large T, the assumption of the model that assuming volatility is constant 
is less likely to be fulfilled; hence, the obtained upper bound is questionable. This 
may also because the holders of restricted shares are mostly agencies of the Chinese 
government whose investment horizon is presumably long, and they were obliged to 
continue holding the shares in state owned enterprises, in order to allow the Chinese 
government to continue to control these SOEs. Transfers of restricted shares between 
Chinese agencies at prices close to zero were rare, and may represent bureaucratic 
transfers of power between agencies, rather than either rational trading as the 
                                                 
3 Our next paper addresses this issue in detail.  
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Longstaff upper bound might suggest or the abuse of economic power. Moreover, 
different from the scale of letter stocks, the scale of restricted shares in China is in big 
scale accounting for around one third of total number shares in the market making the 
alternatives of investment are limited, hence investors have to keep holding restricted 
shares.  
 
As an alternative to assume TTE ≈][ =2010-t, we can assume that the empirically 
observed discount was roughly correct as the case of letter stocks, but investors held 
different expectations about E[T]. In this case, we can calculate the implied E[T] from 
the observed value of F(S,T) in equation (8). The implied E[T] is the length of trading 
constraint required to equate the Longstaff (1995) upper bound to the illiquidity 
discount seen in empirical data. In this case, because our observed discount is around 
77%, the implied T is 6 to 7 year, with variance 0.3. This implied T is shorter than real 
T, hence it is possible that when Chinese agencies were trading with each other before 
2005, they may have been acting as rational profit maximisers, but were too optimistic 
about how soon trading constraints would be released.  
 
5.2 Optimal Portfolio Choice and Illiquidity Discount 
 
Different from the Longstaff (1995) framework in which investor can only change 
position once on freely-traded asset and in which vitality is constant, a continuous-
time trading framework involving two assets with stochastic vitality in the economy is 
proposed by Longstaff (2001). The first asset is a riskless money market account with 
price )(tB  and interest rate 0)( =tr . The second asset is risky with instantaneous 
stochastic volatility of returns follows the dynamic process 
)()()( 1 tdZtVtdV σ=      (9) 
where σ is a constant and )(1 tZ is a standard Brownian motion.  
 The second asset has price dynamics given by: 
)()()()())(()( 2
2 tdZtStVdttStVtdV ++= λµ      (10) 
Where µ  and λ are constants, )(tV  is the instantaneous volatility of returns, and 
)(2 tZ  is a standard Brownian motion independent of )(1 tZ .  
The investor’s wealth at time t is given by  
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)()()()( tMtStNtW +=        (11) 
Where )(tN and )(tM are the number of risky and riskless asset hold by the investor. 
The wealth dynamics are expressed as:  
)()()()()()())(()( 2 tdZtWtwtVdttWtwtVtdW ++= λµ         (12) 
Where the portfolio weight 
)(
)()()(
tW
tStNtw =  
The derived utility of wealth ),,( tVWJ is expressed as: 
)]([lnmax),,(
)(
TWEtVWJ
tw
=              (13) 
Optimal portfolio weight is given by  
)(
)()( 2
2
*
tV
tVtw λµ +=             (14) 
The utility of terminal wealth is expressed as: 
)1)((
2
)1(
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1
6
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2
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σ
λ
σ
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λµ
        (15) 
Equation (14) and (15) provide a complete solution to the investor’s portfolio choice 
problem in this stochastic volatility framework without trading constraints. When 
trading constraints is imposed, we assumed that the investor cannot trade any shares 
within the constraint horizon.  
In this case, the investor’s derived utility of wealth is expressed as 
)]([lnmax),,,,(
)(),0(
TWEtVSNWJ
tw γ
=              (16) 
Where the number of assets the investor can trade per period 0)( =tγ . 






−++= ∫ dssw
sVswsVEtWwtVSNWJ
T
t
)(
2
)()()(()(ln))0(;,,,,( 2
2
2λµ   (17) 
 
We apply Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) approach termed as LSM algorithm to solve 
this problem. First, we discretize the investment horizon ],0[ T  into 0.05 years equal 
intervals and investment horizon T is expressed in units of the discretization interval. 
We normalise the initial values of 0W and 0S to 1. Second, we simulate 100,000 paths 
of V and S using the standard Euler approximation to the dynamics of the volatility 
and share price in equation (9) and (10).  
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Third, we assign all possible initial portfolio weight )0(
)0(
)0()0()0( N
W
SNw == from 
0% to 100% in step of 1% to the 10,000 paths of S making 
)ln(ln 0,,0,, jtjjtj MSNW += where 0,0, 1 jj NM −= . We then take the average value of 
TWln  alone all paths: 
000,10
);(ln
);(ln
000,10
1
0,
0
∑
== j
TTj
TT
wSW
wSW            (18) 
 
The largest average terminal value must be give by the optimal initial portfolio 
weight )0(*w , which equal to 0N .  
 
Existence of trading constraint reduces the derived utility of wealth: 
),,())0(;,,,,( * tVWJwtVSNWJ ≤ . In order to make an investor hold the restricted 
asset, compensation must be offered. The illiquidity is expressed as: 
                   
)))0(;,,,,(),,(exp(
11 *wtVSNWJtVWJ
Dt −
−=        (19) 
 
Table 8 reports the optimal initial portfolio choice with trading constraints for 
different 0V andσ . The initial optimal portfolio weight is negatively related to the 
initial volatility of share price. For T=1, with the increase of initial volatility, investor 
put 100% to 19% initial wealth on risky asset. This decrease is not obvious when 
initial volatility smaller than 0.4.σ  also negatively influences )0(*w  in most cases. 
The size of decrease is bigger for 0V larger than 0.4, whereas it for extreme small and 
large 0V  the corresponding change of )0(
*w  is small. T is also an proxy for the 
illiquidity risk: when T is bigger, there are of more uncertainty. As it shows, larger T 
is associated with smaller initial weight i.e. investor put less initial wealth in risky 
asset when the level of uncertainty is bigger. 
 
Table 9 summarises the illiquidity discount for different V and σ  under optimal 
portfolio strategy. Unlike the positive relationship between discount and V in 
Longstaff (1995) model, it is negative in Longataff (2001). The reasons that the 
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framework of Longstaff (1995) does not allow borrow and continuous rebalance at 
every time step for freely-traded assets but the framework of Longstaff (2001) does. 
In the framework, when volatility changes, µ  does not, implying that the investor can 
enjoy same return with smaller risk. In this case, investor borrows a lot to invest in the 
asset, the portfolio return is huge. Particularly, when the volatility is smaller than 0.3, 
investors borrow money to invest in risky asset, whereas when the volatility is greater 
than 0.5, only less than 20% initial wealth is put into risky asset. On the contrary, 
investor cannot take a leverage position when trading constraint is imposed, 
( %100)0(%0 * ≤≤ w ) in order to in order to guarantee positive wealth along the time 
paths (Longstaff 2001).  
 
σ is positively related to discount in most cases. Biggerσ makes bear higher risk for 
being restricted. The effect of T on illiquidity discount is negative as well: with a 
longer constraint horizon, the illiquidity discount is deeper.  
 
It is also important to note that, although )0(*w is numerically solved and discount 
from those strategies are obtained, this framework allow choosing the optimal 
portfolio weight for restricted risky asset at 0t  i.e. trading constraint is only imposed 
after time 0; we however, consider a situation in which investors cannot trade even at 
time 0, a situation as case of China Stock Market. For the case in China, some 
investors such as SOEs and agencies of government get an endowment at 0t  and their 
position is locked until the trading constraint is released. In this case, closer his/her 
position to )0(*w , higher the value of their portfolio, consequently smaller the 
discount: )))0(;,,,,()))0(;,,,,( * wtVSNWJwtVSNWJ ≥  as illustrate in Table 10.  
 
For those investors whose portfolio weight after endowment is not optimal, the 
discount is bigger than what suggest in Table 9. However, this effect is offset by 
another fact that those such as agencies of government and SEOs are very patient: in 
order to keep control of SOEs, they do not sell shares or do rebalance even they are 
allowed to do so. Our next paper will take subjective discount rate into the model.  
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Furthermore, investor cannot borrow as much as he/she wants to invest in the stock 
market in China i.e. 










 +
= 1,
)(
)(min)( 2
2
tV
tVtw λµ . In this case, investor cannot borrow 
to invest in risky asset even when the volatility is low leading to a smaller utility of 
the liquid benchmark.  Consequently, the discount is smaller that what suggests in 
Table 9. Unlike the previous problem of tradability at 0t , the problem cannot solved 
by simply input 










 +
= 1,
)(
)(min)( 2
2
tV
tVtw λµ into the numerical process because )(tw  
itself already allow for the possible borrowing in future. We need a new solution for 
the optimal portfolio weight. We will address this issue in our another paper.  
 
6. Conclusion  
  
By using the most complete set of available data on auctions of restricted shares in 
China, we examined the price discounts of the restricted shares relative to their 
otherwise identical freely-traded counterparts. We find that restricted shares were 
priced at a deep discount of around 77% relative to their freely traded counterparts 
and price freely-traded shares decrease slightly when their restricted counterparts are 
involved in an occasional transaction. Our empirical model is not totally consistent 
with previous empirical one by Silber (1991) reflecting some difference of 
characteristic of restricted shares in China and in the US. This paper is first piece of 
empirical work testing the effects of trading constraints on illiquidity discount and 
confirmed the theoretical findings of Longstaff (1995, 2001, 2005) that the length of 
the constraint horizon T and the volatility positively affects the illiquidity discount of 
restricted shares. In the end, we make some comparison between empirical and 
theoretical models and between different theoretical frameworks, and then give some 
possible explanations for the difference. Empirical and theoretical investigation the 
effects of releasing trading constraints will be addressed in our further study. 
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Figure 1: The Proportion of Restricted Shares in China Stock 
Market (in percentage) 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Auction 
Auction Size is the number of restricted shares auctioned in a transaction. RTT is the 
number of restricted shares auctioned relative to the total number of shares in the 
listed firm. RTR is the number of restricted shares auctioned relative to the number of 
restricted shares in the listed firm.  
 
  Auction Size RTT RTR 
        
Mean 1165013 0.61% 1.00% 
Standard Error 123145.8113 0.000649 0.001121 
Median 54700 0.03% 0.04% 
Mode 50000 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard Deviation 7868814.9894 0.0297 0.0513 
Kurtosis 412.9206 71.9738 111.9466 
Skewness 16.8347 7.8244 9.1609 
Range 266520000 0.4286 1.0000 
Minimum 0 0.0000 0.0000 
Maximum 266520000 42.86% 100.00% 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Discounts and Difference.  
 
A-1-D is the discount calculated based on the auction price of restricted shares and the closing price of their freely-traded counterparties one day 
before the auction. A-D is the discount calculated based on the auction price of restricted shares and the closing price of their freely-traded 
counterparties on the auction day. A-Difference is the difference between A-1-D and A-D in transaction. 
  
 A-1-D A-D A-Difference 
Mean 78.18% 77.18% -0.62% 
Standard Error 0.15% 0.18% 0.05% 
Median 79.20% 78.60% -0.14% 
Mode 78.84% 75.00% 0.00% 
Standard Deviation 7.39% 8.20% 2.11% 
Sample Variance 0.55% 0.67% 0.04% 
Kurtosis 226.15% 227.65% 5897.92% 
Skewness -82.60% -84.07% -647.78% 
Range 73.26% 79.20% 34.33% 
Minimum 26.74% 20.80% -31.60% 
Maximum 100.00% 100.00% 2.73% 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation Matrix of Discounts from 
Auction     
   A-1-Discount A-Discount Difference 
Exchange -0.2871** -0.3223** -0.0704** 
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0031 
SOE -0.1044** -0.0787** -0.0330 
  0.0000 0.0003 0.1665 
Profit -0.2102** -0.2598** -0.0564* 
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0177 
FR 0.0786** 0.0902** 0.0608* 
  0.0009 0.0000 0.0107 
RTT 0.1088** 0.1188** 0.0585* 
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0139 
sq-RTT 0.0704** 0.0791** 0.0399 
  0.0031 0.0003 0.0942 
RTR 0.1032** 0.1129** 0.0560* 
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0186 
lnMC -0.3413** -0.3862** -0.0499* 
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0362 
Volatility 0.0332 0.0601* 0.0287 
  0.1222 0.0109 0.2646 
P/B   0.0919** 0.0854** -0.0044 
  0.0000 0.0001 0.8538 
P/E 0.0611** 0.0476* -0.0455 
  0.0026 0.0295 0.0560 
NAVPS -0.3787** -0.4129** -0.0950* 
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
Dividend -0.3050** -0.3096** -0.0189 
  0.0000 0.0000 0.4758 
Age -0.3183** -0.3272** -0.1116** 
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
T -0.2952** -0.3074** -0.1415** 
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 27 
Table 4: Regression model for Discounts in Auction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rregression 
Model DA ′  AD  
Difference 
  
R Square 0.359 0.410 0.038 
Coefficents c t c t c t 
(Constant) 1.2992 22.8436 1.4048 27.9156 0.0295 4.0491 
Exchange -0.0359 -9.0538 -0.0413 -12.2438     
SOE             
Profit             
FR 0.0376 2.3746 0.0310 2.2396 0.0101 2.1885 
RTT             
Sq-RTT             
RTR             
LnMC -0.0247 -8.4082 -0.0266 -10.3855     
Volatility 0.2168 3.6310 0.1133 2.3491     
P/B -0.0003 -3.6067 -0.0003 -4.1831     
P/E             
NAVPS -0.0166 -9.9451 -0.0184 -13.9945 -0.0017 -4.0288 
Dividend -0.0158 -5.8606 -0.0136 -5.8371     
Age -0.0180 -6.7767 -0.0139 -6.5485 0.0018 2.5360 
T 0.0098 3.6935 0.0047 2.1762 -0.0031 -4.2939 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Price Premium  
 
Free Share Premium is the price premium of freely-traded shares relative to their NAVPS. Restricted Share Premium is the price premium of 
restricted shares relative to their NAVPS. Premium Difference is the difference between Free Share Premium and Restricted Share Premium.  
 
  Free Share Premium Restricted Share Premium  Premium Difference 
Mean 1000.39% 126.73% 877.46% 
Standard Error 51.67% 7.43% 42.04% 
Median 550.85% 49.19% 499.41% 
Mode 234.75% 1089.23% 285.51% 
Standard Deviation 2331.56% 447.45% 1896.71% 
Sample Variance 54361.71% 2002.10% 35975.26% 
Kurtosis 14346.68% 13983.17% 14127.42% 
Skewness 1082.87% 1095.93% 1063.52% 
Range 40310.19% 7180.83% 34318.75% 
Minimum 0.54% -100.00% 25.42% 
Maximum 40310.73% 7080.83% 34344.17% 
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Table 6: Regression model for Price Premium relative to NAVPS 
 
 
Rregression Model  Free Share Premium 
 Restricted Share 
Premium  
Premium 
Difference 
R Square 0.225 0.204 0.233 
Coefficents  c  t c t c t 
(Constant) 132.818 7.977 22.168 7.120 110.275 8.194 
Exchange -5.701 -5.246 -0.684 -3.237 -5.074 -5.767 
SOE -9.163 -7.073 -1.812 -7.189 -7.231 -6.897 
Profit -36.607 -15.128 -7.106 -15.112 -30.047 -15.347 
FR -26.257 -5.863   -20.927 -5.769 
RTT -68.749 -3.744 -4.896 -5.673 -30.935 -3.418 
Sq-RTT   -17.648 -4.944   
RTR       
LnMC -3.350 -4.067 -0.541 -3.530 -2.791 -4.188 
Volatility 49.281 3.077 9.347 3.008 40.750 3.144 
P/E 0.003 2.529 0.001 4.286 0.002 2.429 
Dividend -2.557 -3.248   -2.222 -3.483 
Age       
T       
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Table 7: Upper Bound of Illiquidity Discount (Longstaff 1995) 
 
  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 
1 8.23% 16.98% 26.28% 46.56% 69.24% 
2 11.79% 24.64% 38.60% 70.09% 100.00% 
3 14.59% 30.78% 48.67% 89.99% 100.00% 
4 16.98% 36.13% 57.59% 100.00% 100.00% 
5 19.13% 40.98% 65.77% 100.00% 100.00% 
6 21.09% 45.48% 73.44% 100.00% 100.00% 
7 22.92% 49.71% 80.73% 100.00% 100.00% 
8 24.64% 53.73% 87.72% 100.00% 100.00% 
9 26.28% 57.59% 94.46% 100.00% 100.00% 
10 27.84% 61.30% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 11 29.33% 64.89% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
12 30.78% 68.38% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
13 32.17% 71.77% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
14 33.53% 75.09% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
15 34.84% 78.34% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
16 36.13% 81.52% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
17 37.38% 84.64% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
18 38.60% 87.72% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
19 39.80% 90.74% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
20 40.98% 93.72% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 
Figure 2 Upper Bound of Illiquidity Discount (Longstaff 1995) 
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Table 8 Optimal Portfolio Choice  
 
)0(*w is the initial optimal portfolio weight when trading constraint is imposed.  
 
  σ  
  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 
         
T  0V     )0(
*w     
1 0.1 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
1 0.2 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
1 0.3 100% 100% 100% 99% 99% 85% 92% 
1 0.4 59% 64% 58% 55% 54% 54% 49% 
1 0.5 38% 37% 36% 35% 33% 34% 30% 
1 0.6 23% 29% 27% 27% 22% 22% 24% 
1 0.7 19% 19% 17% 15% 16% 14% 12% 
         
2 0.1 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
2 0.2 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 97% 91% 
2 0.3 100% 97% 92% 81% 78% 69% 67% 
2 0.4 63% 63% 57% 51% 50% 45% 47% 
2 0.5 36% 37% 34% 34% 32% 30% 28% 
2 0.6 25% 25% 23% 21% 20% 23% 19% 
2 0.7 17% 16% 16% 12% 12% 13% 13% 
         
3 0.1 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 99% 
3 0.2 100% 100% 100% 99% 96% 91% 87% 
3 0.3 100% 92% 86% 76% 73% 72% 68% 
3 0.4 64% 61% 55% 52% 51% 51% 53% 
3 0.5 37% 36% 35% 34% 33% 37% 39% 
3 0.6 22% 23% 22% 22% 21% 24% 27% 
3 0.7 15% 14% 12% 13% 14% 16% 20% 
         
4 0.1 100% 100% 100% 100% 99% 99% 51% 
4 0.2 100% 100% 100% 96% 93% 89% 87% 
4 0.3 100% 91% 83% 76% 74% 73% 73% 
4 0.4 62% 60% 53% 53% 54% 55% 61% 
4 0.5 38% 36% 36% 38% 41% 44% 51% 
4 0.6 21% 22% 21% 23% 28% 33% 39% 
4 0.7 14% 13% 14% 18% 20% 27% 31% 
         
5 0.1 100% 100% 100% 100% 99% 51% 51% 
5 0.2 100% 100% 99% 94% 90% 89% 51% 
5 0.3 100% 90% 81% 77% 75% 76% 78% 
5 0.4 67% 61% 56% 58% 59% 63% 65% 
5 0.5 37% 37% 37% 40% 46% 53% 58% 
5 0.6 23% 23% 26% 28% 35% 41% 52% 
5 0.7 13% 14% 16% 19% 27% 34% 42% 
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Table 9 Illiquidity Discount 
 
  σ  
  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 
         
T  0V   
1 0.1 36.38% 33.45% 34.61% 40.83% 54.92% 80.45% 99.80% 
1 0.2 6.55% 5.67% 5.63% 7.34% 13.55% 29.86% 77.71% 
1 0.3 2.82% 1.42% 1.43% 1.85% 4.77% 12.72% 47.75% 
1 0.4 1.37% 1.13% 0.61% 1.05% 2.58% 7.53% 30.52% 
1 0.5 0.82% 0.53% 0.50% 0.90% 1.75% 4.54% 20.80% 
1 0.6 0.71% 0.38% 0.49% 0.74% 1.40% 3.35% 15.26% 
1 0.7 0.55% 0.24% 0.48% 0.39% 1.06% 2.54% 11.01% 
         
2 0.1 88.84% 72.61% 59.95% 55.79% 62.53% 82.78% 99.82% 
2 0.2 38.19% 21.62% 12.96% 9.91% 13.07% 27.77% 76.94% 
2 0.3 18.02% 9.22% 4.07% 2.73% 3.18% 11.11% 45.88% 
2 0.4 10.20% 5.15% 2.33% 1.76% 1.94% 5.72% 29.11% 
2 0.5 7.26% 3.53% 1.72% 1.08% 1.54% 4.34% 20.38% 
2 0.6 5.28% 2.17% 1.61% 1.09% 1.16% 3.12% 14.61% 
2 0.7 3.94% 2.13% 1.42% 1.24% 0.96% 2.52% 10.97% 
         
3 0.1 100.00% 98.32% 87.20% 73.79% 71.40% 85.24% 99.84% 
3 0.2 91.05% 59.72% 32.18% 17.98% 15.11% 27.34% 76.29% 
3 0.3 64.86% 31.22% 13.44% 6.38% 2.97% 9.86% 43.64% 
3 0.4 43.75% 18.55% 7.61% 3.08% 2.06% 4.83% 27.87% 
3 0.5 30.78% 12.51% 5.46% 2.36% 1.53% 4.06% 19.51% 
3 0.6 22.90% 9.37% 4.27% 2.15% 1.81% 3.13% 14.72% 
3 0.7 17.62% 7.30% 3.50% 1.96% 1.98% 2.83% 11.09% 
         
4 0.1 100.00% 100.00% 98.97% 89.47% 80.52% 87.72% 99.85% 
4 0.2 100.00% 94.89% 62.44% 32.46% 19.19% 26.97% 75.64% 
4 0.3 99.19% 71.98% 32.48% 12.22% 4.31% 7.76% 42.65% 
4 0.4 93.19% 50.59% 19.16% 6.87% 3.10% 4.16% 27.04% 
4 0.5 81.88% 35.87% 12.62% 4.26% 2.04% 3.62% 18.86% 
4 0.6 69.44% 26.71% 9.47% 4.20% 2.40% 3.40% 14.60% 
4 0.7 58.42% 20.38% 7.33% 2.89% 2.20% 3.16% 11.26% 
         
5 0.1 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 97.71% 88.54% 90.22% 99.87% 
5 0.2 100.00% 99.99% 90.15% 52.18% 25.61% 27.82% 75.00% 
5 0.3 100.00% 98.13% 61.64% 22.99% 7.48% 6.31% 40.46% 
5 0.4 100.00% 89.03% 40.62% 12.58% 3.92% 3.38% 24.75% 
5 0.5 99.95% 75.22% 27.66% 8.80% 3.22% 3.80% 18.50% 
5 0.6 99.50% 62.25% 20.65% 6.84% 2.80% 3.53% 14.21% 
5 0.7 97.97% 51.05% 15.65% 5.74% 2.85% 3.24% 11.30% 
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Table 10 Illiquidity Discount for all initial portfolio weight 
 
 
